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PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT
CORPORATE DIRECTORS
Platt Corp. v. Platt
42 Misc. 2d 640, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. 1964)
Plaintiff Platt Corporation brought this claim against certain of its
directors to recover damages allegedly stemming from a breach of their
fiduciary duty to attend directors' meetings and to exercise independent
supervision and control over the affairs of the corporation. Plaintiff as-
serted resulting mismanagement and waste of corporate assets.' The non-
domiciliary directors, Blumberg and Hawley, were personally served at
their respective domiciles in Florida and Illinois, and the instant opinion
deals with a motion to vacate that service. For the six months' term
of his directorship, Blumberg was never physically present in New York,
where the corporation had its headquarters and principal place of busi-
ness and where all directors' meetings were held. Although director
Hawley went to six directors' meetings during his nearly twelve months
as a director, his case is treated no differently by the court. Both de-
fendant directors executed certificates in lieu of attendance at directors'
meetings and waivers of notice of special meetings of the board, but
all of these were executed outside of the State of New York, although
they were dated on their face at New York. The court denied the mo-
tion to vacate, sustaining the extraterritorial service on the non-domiciliary
directors under section 302 of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules,
which provides in part for such personal service on non-domiciliaries for
causes of action arising from the commission of "a tortious act within
the state."' 2
I In New York such an action may rest upon the statutory or common law
fiduciary duty of directors to maintain certain standards of care in the management of
the corporation, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 720 (a) (1) (A) ; Feuer, Personal Liabilities
of Corporate Officers and Directors 11, 13-23 (1961); 3 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Cor-
porations §§ 1029, 1033-38, 1049, 1070 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1947) ; Grange, Corporation
Law for Officers and Directors 403-04 (1940), particularly where the defendant may
be characterized as a "dummy director," Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 223
N.Y. 103, 119 N.E. 237 (1918), 3 Fletcher, op. cit. supra § 1062, 1070, 1090. Continued
lack of attendance at directors' meetings and complete inattention to firm business
will result in liability if it can be shown that there is a causal relation between a
director's inattention and the losses suffered. See Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S.
504 (1919) ; Grange, op. cit. supra at 409-10. The complaint in the instant case was
held to state a cause of action in tort in a later opinion. Plait Corp. v. Platt, 21 App.
Div. 2d 116, 249 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1964), reversing 41 Misc. 2d 435, 246 N.Y.S2d 134
(1963).
2 The section reads in full as follows:
§ 302. Personal jurisdiction by acts of non-domiciliaries.
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. A court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator,
as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this
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The present analysis is concerned with the issue whether the court
properly exercised in personam jurisdiction over the defendants under
the noted statute, rather than with the merits of plaintiff's claim, which
were not at issue in the opinion considered herein. Although in statutes
like section 302 jurisdiction appears to depend upon ultimate liability
in tort,3 the courts have so interpreted them that it is unnecessary to
decide, for the purposes of determining jurisdiction, the ultimate ques-
tion of whether defendant's conduct was tortious, resulting in liability
to the plaintiff; rather, jurisdiction depends upon the existence of cer-
tain jurisdictional facts, which alone are at issue in a direct 4 or col-
lateral5, attack on the court's jurisdiction. What the jurisdictional facts
are will vary with the individual case, but they must satisfy the minimum
contacts test 6 for the constitutionality of in personam jurisdiction under
the federal due process clause.7 Jurisdictional requirements have been
held to be met when the defendant, personally or through an agent, is
the author of acts or omissions within the state, and when the com-
section, in the same manner as if he were a domiciliary of the state, if,
in person or through an agent, he:
1. transacts any business within the state, or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of
action for defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. owns, uses, or possesses any real property situated within the state.
(b) Effect of appearance. Where personal jurisdiction is based solely upon
this section, an appearance does not confer such jurisdiction with re-
spect to causes of action not arising from an act enumerated in this
section.
The statute specifically limits jurisdiction to causes of action arising from the acts
enumerated. This discussion will be limited to such causes of action, with the additional
limitation that jurisdiction could not be sustained on one of the traditional grounds
such as domicile or physical presence at time of service. The Supreme Court has dis-
tinguished the problem of suit in a forum for causes of action not arising from the
defendant's activities within the forum. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437 (1952). Apparently there is a concept of a level of systematic and
continued activity within the state of forum such that a defendant may be subjected
to suit there on causes of action arising from activities having no contact with or
special relation to the state of forum. Id. at 446-49; Carmody-Forkosch, New York
Practice § 211 (8th ed. 1963). However, the minimum contacts test is usually thought
to apply only to suits arising out of defendant's "contacts" with the state of forum.
See, e.g., Restatement, Judgments § 23, comment e. (1942).
SJenner & Tone, "Historical and Practice Notes," Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 17,
at 170-71 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1963).
4 See Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 391-95, 143 N.E2d 673, 680-82 (1957),
interpreting an identical provision of Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1957),
after which § 302 was patterned, Advisory Committee Notes, 1 New York
Standard Civil Practice Service § 302 (1963).
5See Green v. Bluff Creek Oil Co., 287 F2d 66 (5th Cir. 1961), reversing lower
court for determining merits on collateral attack of Illinois default judgment.
6 The minimum contacts test is discussed in text at notes 26-58, infra.
7 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ; Feathers
v. McLucas, 21 App. Div. 2d 558, 560, 251 N.Y.S2d 548, 551 (1964) ("The single act
statute has merely codified the minimum contacts test.").
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plaint states a cause of action in tort.8 Under a more extended view, the
presence in the forum state of a product manufactured by defendant, alleg-
edly causing injury to plaintiff because of its defective manufacture, has
been held sufficient where the court felt it could reasonably infer the
presence of other of defendant's products in the state.9
Regardless of what jurisdictional facts are required, jurisdiction
does not depend upon ultimate liability in tort and is not destroyed by
a finding of no ultimate liability at trial."' An opposite rule would be
unduly prejudicial to the defendant: if the ultimate decision found him
innocent of tort, the court would have lacked jurisdiction ab initio, the
decision would not be res judicata, and defendant would be subject to
another suit in his state of domicile. 1 Yet if jurisdiction depended on
the outcome of a preliminary hearing determining the tortiousness of
defendant's conduct, many issues would have to be relitigated at the
trial on the merits after jurisdiction was found.'- In either case, the
defendant could in effect force trial of the issue of tort in his own state,
under the guise of a trial of jurisdictional facts, by simply ignoring the
foreign court's process, suffering default judgment to be rendered against
him, and collaterally attacking jurisdiction in his own state.' 8 Under
the correct procedure, the plaintiff alleges jurisdictional facts in his com-
plaint,14 and upon making a motion to quash service of summons, de-
fendant either controverts the jurisdictional facts alleged, in which case
the court determines them as any issues of fact,'5 or allows the court
to test their sufficiency as they stand in the petition.16 In the instant
case, the court found the requisite jurisdictional facts to be present,
holding that the language of the statute requiring the commission of
a "tortious act within the state" was satisfied, as were the requirements
of due process.' 7
8 Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E2d 673 (1957) ; Smyth v. Twin State
Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 8 A.2d 664 (1951).
9 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E2d 761 (1961).
1o Nelson v. Miller, supra note 8.
" Nelson v. Miller, supra note 8, at 392-93, 143 N.E2d 673, at 681
(dictum) ; see Weinstein, Korn & Miller, 1 New York Civil Practice. 302.09 (1964).
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Lebensfeld v. Tuch, 43 Misc. 2d 719, 252 N.Y.S2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1964);
Jenner & Tone, "Historical and Practice Notes," Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 17, at 170
(Smith-Hurd 1957); 1 New York Standard Civil Practice Service § 302, Forms
1:65, 1:66, 1:67 (1963).
15For examples of the court's handling of the situation when defendant contra-
dicts plaintiff's assertions of jurisdictional facts, see Davis v. Ghan, 227 F. Supp. 867
(S.D. N.Y. 1964), where, on interrogatories by plaintiff, defendant admitted contacts
with New York which the court held sufficient to sustain jurisdiction, and Gottlieb
v. Sandia American Corp., 35 F.R.D. 223 (E.D. Pa. 1964), ordering preliminary
hearing on certain issues.
16See, e.g., O'Connor v. Wells, 43 Misc. 2d 1075, 252 N.Y.S2d 861 (Sup.
Ct. 1964).
1742 Misc. 2d at 649, 249 N.Y.S2d at 11.
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Many states have in recent years enacted omnibus long-arm juris-
dictional statutes similar to the New York statute,1 8 the latter described
by its authors as being designed "to take advantage of the constitutional
power of the state . . . to subject non-residents to personal jurisdiction
when they commit acts within the state."'19 This should illustrate that
the territorial framework for personal jurisdiction constructed by Pen-
noyer v. Neff,20 providing that a state could not acquire jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant by serving process upon him without the
state,21 has undergone considerable modification. 22 Yet it is still true that
a state cannot acquire jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who
is not physically present within the state simply by serving him with
process without the state or by publication. 23 The due process clause
interposes two requirements: a power-basis for exercise of jurisdiction
and a procedure for giving adequate notice to the defendant so that he
18 Comprehensive long-arm statutes, similar to the Illinois and New York
statutes or more particularized: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-411 (1960) as amended
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33411 (Supp. 1964); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 5-514-16 (Supp.
1963) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 16-17 (Smith-Hurd 1956) ; Laws of Kan. 1963, ch.
303, § 60-308; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 112, § 21 (Supp. 1963); Mich. Stat. Ann.
§§ 27A-701-41 (1962) ; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. ch. 2701, Rule 4B (1964) ; N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 55-144-46 (1960); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 4.28-180-85 (1959); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 262.05 (Supp. 1965). Statutes of the Vermont type, allowing jurisdiction
based on a contract to be performed in whole or in part within the state or on the
commission of a tort in whole or in part within the state: Iowa Code Ann. § 617.3
(Supp. 1964) ; Md. Ann. Code art. 23, 92 (1957) (language variation: "or liability
incurred for acts done within this state") ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 303.13 (Supp. 1963) ;
Mo. Ann Stat. 351.630 (Supp. 1963) (commission of tort or transaction of business
only); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2031b (1964); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §855
(1958) ; W. Va. Code Ann. § 3083 (1961). Two states attempt expressly to allow
jurisdiction wherever the Constitution permits: N. J. Rules of Civ. Proc. 4:4-4d (1958)
(service by mail on foreign corporations, but "subject to due process") ; R. I. Gen.
Laws Ann. 9-5-33 (Supp. 1964) ("necessary minimum contacts . . . not contrary
to . . . the constitution or laws of the United States"). In addition, several states
allow extended jurisdiction either by statutory or judicial extension of the doing
business concept, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. 47.16-.161 (Supp. 1964) (engaging in business
within state presumed by sale of goods to anyone within the state).
19 Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 288, 200 N.E.2d 427, 431,
251 N.Y.S.2d 433, 348 (1964); Advisory Committee Notes, 1 New York Standard
Civil Practice Service § 302 (1963).
2095 U.S. 714 (1877). The court's classic statement of the doctrine of personal
service appeared at 727: "Process from the tribunals of one State cannot run into
another State, and summon parties there domiciled to leave its territory and respond
to proceedings against them." See Anderson, "Personal Jurisdiction Over Out-
siders," 28 Mo. L. Rev. 336, 343 (1963).
21 Of course, the state can serve a resident or domiciliary temporarily without
the state as if he were within the state, providing that the method of service is
reasonably calculated to afford him notice of the suit. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457 (1940); Carmdy-Forkosch, New York Practice § 192 (8th ed. 1963).
22See Annot., 2 L. Ed. 2d 1664 (1958), supplementing Annot., 94 L. Ed. 1167
(1950).
23 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
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may defend.2 4 Personal service of summons is, of course, adequate notice,
so that the latter requirement is not at issue in the instant case.25
From territoriality as a power-basis the Supreme Court moved to
a test of "minimum contacts" with the state of forum in the leading
case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,28 opening the door for
the recent expansion of state court jurisdiction. The test was stated by
Mr. Chief Justice Stone:
But now that capias ad respondendum has given way to personal
service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in per-
sonam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the main-
tenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice." 27
And further:
Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due
process clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate that
a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an
individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no
contacts, ties, or relation.28
The most extended Supreme Court case sustaining jurisdiction under
the minimum contacts test is McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. 2 9 The
defendant's contacts in that case consisted of the mailing of a life in-
surance contract into California, its acceptance there by the insured,30
and the receipt of the premiums and proofs of the insured's death, mailed
from California. However, in Hanson v. Denckla,31 the Court's majority
said:
2 4 Anderson, supra note 20, at 338.
25 42 Misc. 2d at 648, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 10. See Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
26 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
27 Id. at 316.
2 8Id. at 319.
29 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The McGee case was strongly criticized as a violation of
the territorial principle of law in Stimson, "Omnibus Statutes Designed to Secure
Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Defendants," 48 A.B.A.J. 725 (1962).
30 The policy, originally purchased from an Arizona corporation, was subse-
quently assumed by defendant Texas corporation.
31357 U.S. 235 (1958) (5-4 decision). The settlor of a trust, who had become
a Florida resident, mailed from Florida to a Delaware trust company the execution
of a power of appointment. The power of appointment was notarized and witnessed
in Florida and the settlor subsequently died there and her will, substantially affected
by the power of appointment, was probated in Florida. The Court held that Florida
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But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the even-
tual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
courts .... Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the re-
spective States. However minimal the burden of defending in a
foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so
unless he has had the "minimal contacts" with that State that
are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.
2
Although it has been said that this language signaled a return to
territoriality as the power-basis for in personam jurisdiction,3 that in-
terpretation is unlikely in view of the fact that a minority of the Court
would have sustained jurisdiction and in view of the following language
of the majority:
The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature
of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.34
Rather, the Hanson case illustrates that the Court is not willing to allow
untrammeled nationvide jurisdiction to state courts, for both the ma-
jority and the minority indicated that territorial limitations on the power
of the states still have significance3 5
There appear to be three vaguely defined factors involved in the
Supreme Court's concept of minimum contacts as a basis for a state's
constitutional exercise of in personan jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants. In the non-resident motorist cases, the basis for the state's
jurisdiction is the police power,8 6 and in McGee the Court pointed to
the "manifest interest" of the state in providing its citizens with redress
against non-paying, out-of-state, insurers, who were within a traditional
field of state regulation.37 Some type of state interest in the defendant's con-
acquired no jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee, the corpus of the trust, or the
beneficiaries (other than those living in Florida) by personal service upon them
outside of the state.
82 357 U.S. at 251.
33Stimson, supra note 29.
84 357 U.S. at 253.
38 Kurland, "The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts," 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569, 619, 623 (1958).
86 See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). The definitive article placing
such jurisdiction on a non-consensual, police-power basis is Scott, "Jurisdiction Over
Nonresident Motorists," 39 Harv. L. Rev. 563 (1926).
3 7 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). See Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647-49 (1950).
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tact with the forum state would thus appear to be one factor of the
minimum contacts test.
38
The Supreme Court has spoken of a higher degree of state interest s9
in the few cases it has decided than have many state courts. The rationale
of the state decisions has been that the state has a legitimate interest in
providing a reasonable means of redress in its courts against persons who,
having had substantial contact with the state, have incurred obligations to
those entitled to the state's protection. 40 The Illinois Supreme Court in
Nelson v. Miller 4 1 stated: "The [Illinois] legislature may direct its
policy to the fact of injury as well as to its probability." 42 These notions
make jurisdiction appear to depend in part upon the consequences in fact
of defendant's act, despite the fact that injury caused by defendant to
plaintiff need only be alleged, not proved, under the proper interpretation
of "tortious act" statutes like section 302(a) (2) .43 It is the quality and
nature of the defendant's act, rather than its consequences, that gives the
state an interest in providing extended personal jurisdiction for the adjudi-
cation of claims arising out of that act.44 Thus, in Hanson v. Denckla, the
Court distinguished the McGee case on the lack of defendant's purposeful
solicitation in the forum state.45 Since there was no act of such quality and
nature, the suit there in question was not one to enforce a consequent obli-
gation in which the state had an interest.
3 8 Anderson, supra note 20, at 350; 50 Ill. B. J. 438 (1962). See Towe, "Personal
Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents and Montana's New Rule 4B," 24 Mont. L. Rev. 3,
13-15 (1963). Cf. Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 84, comment c (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1956).S39The Supreme Court has used the term "manifest interest!' in the McGee and
Hanson cases and has never sanctioned extended jurisdiction without such an in-
terest as the term there described. Cf. Watson v. Employers Liability Corp., 348 U.S.
66 (1954) (Louisiana direct action statute, providing compensation for auto accident
victims); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (out-of-state,
unauthorized, mail-order insurer); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945) (collection of state unemployment taxes); Henry L. Doherty & Co. v.
Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) (providing redress for victim of unauthorized security
dealing).
40 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E2d 673 (1957); Smyth
v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951). Some courts
rather fictitiously resort to the language of dangerous instrumentality in an attempt
to show greater state interest. Cf. Singer v. Walker, 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250
N.Y.S.2d 216 (1964) (hammer dangerous instrumentality if defectively made);
Feathers v. McLucas, 21 App. Div. 2d 558, 281 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1964) (truck gasoline
tanker dangerous if defectively made).
4111 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).42 Id. at 389, 143 N.E2d at 679.
43 See text to notes 3-16 supra. See "Developments in the Law-State Court
Jurisdiction," 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 928 (1960).
44 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) ; Restatement
(Second), Conflict of Laws § 84, comment c (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956); Towe,
supra note 38, at 16-18.
45 357 U.S. at 252-53.
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The second factor of the minimum contacts test looks" to the ex-
tent of defendant's contacts with the forum state,4 6 rather than their
quality. Clearly, however, the two are interdependent.47 For example,
in McGee the quality of the defendant's act gave the state an interest
in providing extended personal jurisdiction, although it might have seemed
that there was as much contact in Hanson.48 Probably all acts by -a de-
fendant within the state of forum that may result in torts are of suf-
ficient quality to allow the state to exercise extended personal jurisdiction
over the actor.49 However, where the defendant's activities occurred out-
side the forum state, allegedly resulting in injury within, the Supreme
Court of Illinois found it necessary to infer a large number of contacts
to bolster its decision.50 The quantity of contact becomes most impor-
tant in contract actions where the contacts of defendant with the forum
state in relation to the transaction are closely examined by the courts;
the quality of a single act by defendant, such as signing a contract
within the forum state, is felt to be insufficient to allow the state ex-
tended personal jurisdiction over the defendant 5
The third factor involved in the minimum contacts test is one of
trial convenience 52 and is based on considerations similar to those of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In the McGee case,53 the in-
sured's death occurred in plaintiff's home state-California- and wit-
nesses for or against the insurance company's claim of suicide were
located there. In Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
the court declared that under the Illinois statute the situs of the injury
should be considered the place where the tort occurred for purposes
of personal jurisdiction. 54 This principle in fact represents the conflict-
of-laws principle for choice of law,55 and the Supreme Court is united
on the point that "jurisdiction over defendants does not flow as a
necessary concomitant of jurisdiction to apply local law to the con-
46Restatement (Second), supra note 44, § 84, comment c; 50 Ill. B.J. 438, 441
(1962) (called simply minimum contact).
47 Restatement, supra note 44, § 84, comment c. Cf. "Developments in the Law,"
supra note 43, at 923-24.
48 See Kurland, supra note 35, at 622 n.280.
40 See Stimson, supra note 29, at 726; "Developments in the Law", supra note 43,
at 926.
50 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., supra note 40.
51 See Compania de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357
(majority), 108 A.2d 372 (dissent) (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
The Boston Metals case was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in McGee.
355 U.S. 223 n.2 (1957). Cf. "Developments in the Law," supra note 43, at 926-28.
52 Carmody-Forkosch, New York Practice § 211, at 191 (8th ed. 1963); Re-
statement, supra note 44, § 84, comment c; Towe, supra note 38, at 15-16; Annot.,
94 L. Ed. 1167 (1950); 50 Ill. B.J. 438, 441 (1962).
53355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
54 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
55 50 Geo. L.J. 310, 312 (1961); 36 Tulane L. Rev. 336, 337 (1962).
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troversy." " Yet jurisdiction to apply local law is considered an im-
portant factor of convenience.57 In most tort actions the factors of
convenience will weigh in favor of the situs of the injury as the forum.
Yet the Supreme Court has said explicitly that convenience alone is not
sufficient to sustain jurisdiction.5 8 This would seem proper, for, carried
to the extreme, mere convenience as a jurisdictional criterion would al-
low trial in states which have no interest whatever in the proceedings,
but which might be most convenient because of their central location
to the states of domicile of the various parties. This might lead to
intolerable forum shopping as plaintiffs sought the most favorable laws,
procedures, and courts. Trial convenience, then, is another factor to be
balanced in determining whether a state should exercise extended per-
sonal jurisdiction in a given case.
Applying the minimum contacts test as analyzed, the instant case
would seem to be a proper one for the state's assumption of personaljurisdiction over the non-resident directors, assuming an adequately drafted
enabling statute.5 9 New York would seem to have whatever quantum
of state interest is required-whether manifest or something less-in
the duties assumed by directors of a corporation having its principal
place of business in New York. Under its police power to regulate cor-
porations the state could probably condition the doing of business on
such a scale in New York on the execution by directors of a formal
consent to suit in that state for causes of action arising out of their
directorships.60 Presumably the directors would be subject to suit in
New York for any torts committed in the exercise of their duty to
attend directors' meetings.61 They should not therefore be allowed to
set up omission of that duty as a bar to jurisdiction. Concerning the
56 Kurland, supra note 35, at 619.
57 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258 (1957) (dissent). See Kurland, spra
note 35, at 619-20; 19 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 271 (1962).
58 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1957).
59 See Restatement, supra note 44, § 84, comment e; § 85, comment d.
60 See Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 168, § 169 (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1962). Cf. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1318. The International Shoe case dispensed with
fictive consent as a basis for jurisdiction, 326 U.S. at 318, substituting the minimum
contacts test, 326 U.S. at 316. But actual consent to the state's jurisdiction was recog-
nized even in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 733. Thus, one who brings suit in a state,
or acts as an attorney of record in an action, is considered to have voluntarily as-
sented to the court's exercise of jurisdiction over him for causes of action related
to such activities by whatever reasonable means of notice the state might devise,
the power-basis requirement for the exercise of jurisdiction being satisfied. Adams
v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938); Kurland, "The Supreme Court, the Due
Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts," 25 U. Chi. L. Rev.
569, 575 (1958). This is the principle upon which the waiver of objections to per-
sonal jurisdiction by a general appearance is based. Ibid.
61 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 187a, § 188, § 192 (Tent. Draft No.
7, 1962).
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extent of defendants' contacts with New York, a single contract made
and performable only within the forum state has been held to be
contact sufficient to justify a state's exercise of personal jurisdiction over
a non-resident defendant by extraterritorial service.6 2 Although a di-
rector-corporation relation is not truly contractual, but a fiduciary re-
lationship, the analogy of sufficient minimum contact is present. In addition
to the directorship relation and the location of the corporation's principal
office in New York, significant contact is founded in the necessity of per-
formance of directoral duties in New York. The factor of trial convenience
in New York is also significant. The corporate records are in New York,
New York law probably governs0 3 and the stockholders are more likely
to be there than anywhere else that can be designated.6 4 Thus, there are
cogent arguments for requiring the non-resident directors to defend in
New York. Furthermore, one of the principal dangers of expanded juris-
diction, that of drawing defendant from a distance at great expense to
defend a frivolous lawsuit, would seem to be negligible in the case of actions
by corporation against their own directors.65
Difficulties arise in the instant case when one views the facts over
which jurisdiction was assumed, the court's reasons for assuming it, and
the statute upon which jurisdiction was based. By construing the statute
as it did, the court adopted a strained interpretation of section 302 (a)
(2), which requires the commission of "a tortious act within the state."
The plain meaning of the quoted phrase would seem to require that
the act or ommission 66 asserted as a jurisdictional fact occur within the
02 Compania de Astral, S. A. v. Boston Metals Co., supra note 51; Janklow v.
Williams, 43 Misc. 2d 1053, 252 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Lewis v. American
Archives Assoc., 43 Misc. 2d 721, 252 N.Y.S2d 217 (Sup. Ct. 1964). But see
Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 200 N.E.2d 427, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433,
(1964) ; Hoard v. U.S. Paint, Lacquer & Chem. Corp., 44 Misc. 2d 72, 253 N.Y.S.2d
89 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
63 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1317. But see Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws
§ 187 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962) ; id § 166a, Caveat No. 1.
64 A further convenience argument used by the court in the instant case is that
the plaintiff may be forced to prosecute multiple actions if jurisdiction is not sus-
tained by New York. 42 Misc. 2d at 649, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
(5 Consistently with these arguments, several states have provided for extraterri-
torial service on non-resident directors of corporations having their principal place
of business therein. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.705(6) (Revised Judicature Act 1962) ;
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. ch. 2701, Rule 4B (1964). See Laws of Kan. 1963, ch. 303, §
60-308; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 262.05(8) (Supp. 1965) (directors of domestic corpo-
rations only).
6 As the court in the instant case holds, tortious omissions would seem to
satisfy the meaning of the statute as well. To hold otherwise would be to make a
sterile misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction. Such an omission may in some cases be
properly deemed to have occurred in a particular state. Such a case would exist,
for example, where a parent knew his child would light matches left lying around,
did not take proper precautions, and, as a result, the child burned down the hotel in
which they were staying. The parent omitted to act within a particular state and
would be subject to that state's extraterritorial process.
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borders of New York,6 7 i.e., that the allegedly tortious conduct itself,
not just the resultant injury take place in New York.68 Viewed as re-
quiring these operative jurisdictional facts, section 302(a)(2) is clearly
constitutional.6 9 But these are not the existing jurisdictional facts in the
instant case.70 The court resorts to the fiction that "a tortious act is
deemed to have been committed at the place of injury resulting from
such act" in order to sustain jurisdiction.71 This is a statement of
result rather than a reason. In reality the non-acts regarded by the
court as the basis of jurisdiction had no location, and an attempt to
assign them one in New York rather than Florida or Illinois is an ef-
fort required by an inadequate statute. The court's effort also focuses
on the tortiousness of defendant's conduct and the fact of injury, which
have been shown to be improper jurisdictional facts.72 The key jurisdic-
tional fact in the instant case is the assumption of duties by the defendants
as directors of a corporation located in New York, which could in no way
be described as a "tortious act."
Notwithstanding these criticisms, however, it is still arguable that
the court's exercise of jurisdiction in the instant case was constitutional
since the criticisms concern the court's reasons for sustaining jurisdic-
tion and its interpretation of section 302(a) (2). It is usually held that
the scope of a state statute is a problem of state law only. It will be
argued, however, that there may be a constitutional problem when juris-
diction is based on a statute that has no proper application to the facts
at hand. As to whether the legislature intended to provide by this "tor-
tious act" statute for jurisdiction over non-resident defendants who have
not acted but have merely effected consequences within New York, the
legislative history is ambiguous. 78 Nevertheless, the New York courts
67 Thornton, "First Judicial Interpretations of the New York Single Act Statute,"
30 Brooklyn L. Rev. 285, 291-94, 296-301 (1964) (torturous construction); 50 Geo.
L. J. 310, 312-13 (1961) (strained interpretation).
68 Legislation, 29 Brooklyn L. Rev. 305, 311 (1963).
69 See Nelson v. Miller, supra note 40, Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp.,
supra note 40; "Developments in the Law," supra note 43, at 926; Legislation, 29
Brooklyn L. Rev. 305 (1963). Cf. Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281,
200 N.E.2d 427, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964).
70 See discussion in text at notes 59-65.
7142 Misc. 2d at 646, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 8. This fiction was derived from Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., supra note 54, which interprets the
Illinois statute after which § 302(a) (2) was patterned. See Simonson v. Inter-
national Bank, supra note 69; Advisory Committee Notes, 1 New York Standard
Civil Practice Service § 302 (1963).
7 2 See text at notes 3-16, 40-45, 74 in! ra; "Developments in the Law," supra
note 43, at 1017 n.701.
73 1 Weinstein, Korn, & Miller, New York Practice ff 302.10 (1964). However,
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., supra note 54, decided
before passage of § 302, interpreted the Illinois statute to allow jurisdiction where
consequences only occurred in Illinois. Yet this result was contrary to four previous
cases interpreting the Illinois statute, Insull v. New York. World-Telegram Corp,
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have tended to accept the idea of aquiring personal jurisdiction by ex-
traterritorial service on non-resident individuals and corporations in this
situation, drawing a line roughly based on the reasonable expectation
that defendant's conduct outside the forum state would result in con-
sequences within, 74 a theory which at least properly focuses on the quality
of defendant's act rather than on the consequences in fact resulting from
it. But the course of the decisions has been far from uniform, 7 and it
is apparent that the minimum contacts test has left the courts at large
on the issue of personal jurisdiction, despite the presence or absence of
particular statutory provisions. 7
It is said that the International Shoe case "contains only a statement
of policy when 'what are needed are rules of a fairly definite character...
policy alone will not suffice [though] any such rules must be firmly based
upon considerations of policy.' "77 In regard to the vague and undefined
standards of International Shoe and McGee, the New York Court of Ap-
peals recently said:
The formulation of specific rules to implement such a standard
seems more appropriately the function of the legislature than of the
273 F2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959); Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270 F2d 821
(7th Cir. 1959); Heliriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill.
1957) ; Grobark v. Addo Machine Co., 16 Ill. 2d 426, 158 N.E2d 73 (1959). The
legislative history does tend to refute the idea that § 302(a) (2) was intended to
apply to torts of this type. The section originally read "commits a tortious act
within the state resulting in physical injury to person or property" (emphasis
supplied), and was rewritten by New York Senate committee merely to make
sure that libel, slander and similar actions were excluded. Carmody-Forkosch, New
York Practice § 196 nn.9, 11 (8th ed. 1963). The kind of economic loss through
neglect which would seem to be the basis for the complaint in the instant case
would not appear to be encompassed by the original wording.
74 See Feathers v. McLucas, 21 App. Div. 2d 558, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1964) ; Ellis
v. Newton Paper Co., 44 Misc. 2d 134, 253 N.Y.S.2d 47 (Sup. Ct. 1964) ; Fornabaio
v. Swissair Transport Co., 42 Misc. 2d 182, 247 N.Y.S2d 203 (Sup. Ct. 1964);
Johnson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 43 Misc. 2d 850, 252 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct.
1964) ; Moss v. Frost Hempstead Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 357, 251 N.Y.S2d 194 (Sup. Ct.
1964). But see Greenberg v. R. S. P. Realty Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 182, 250 N.Y.S.2d 460
(Sup. Ct. 1964) (by implication); Muraco v. Ferentino, 42 Misc. 2d 104, 247
N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
75 The New York courts reiterate the language of the Gray case and of reason-
able jurisdiction when they sustain jurisdiction. See note 74 supra. However, the
courts speak of mere isolated contacts and cite Hanson when they reject jurisdiction.
Simonson v. International Bank, supra note 69 ("bare allegation of a single contract"
but reversing lower court on another ground); Muraco v. Ferentino, 42 Misc. 2d
104, 247 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup. Ct. 1964) ; Perlmutter v. Standard Roofing & Tinsmith
Supply Co., 43 Misc. 2d 885, 252 N.Y.S2d 583 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
76 See Anderson, "Personal Jurisdiction Over Outsiders," 28 Mo. L. Rev. 336,
367 (1963). See generally id. at 352-68.
77 Dodd, "Jurisdiction in Personal Actions," 23 Ill. L. Rev. 427, 437 (1929);
Kurland, supra note 35, at 591.
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courts .... Legislation, as distinguished from judicial revision,
is the more suitable vehicle for fixing precise jurisdictional guide-
lines for the future; only through such legislation may foreign
corporations be put on notice that they run the risk of being ex-
posed to suit here, even though they may not be "doing business"
in New York, if they "have occasion to enter the state for the
purpose of making contracts here."78s
The quoted language would seem to be equally applicable to individual or
corporate defendants who act or fail to act outside the state of forum. The
New York statute in question fails to give explicit notice that by so doing,
such defendants may be subject to suit within New York. Yet in the instant
case, because the directors had a fiduciary duty to perform the functions
of their directorship, this lack of notice does not appear unduly prejudicial.
If the due process clause has any function in the area of personal juris-
diction, it must include protection of defendants against distant litigation,
especially groundless litigation. 79 The indefiniteness of the minimum con-
tacts test means that a defendant served outside the forum state as a
practical matter must always appear to contest jurisdiction. Not knowing
whether he will be subject to jurisdiction in the forum state, he cannot
safely suffer a default judgment and collaterally attack the court's exercise
of jurisdiction, as he could if it were clear that the court had no jurisdic-
tion.80 Yet because of the complexity of the test for personal jurisdiction,
it is likely that in a significant number of cases there will be a lengthy
contest of the issue in the distant state, with resultant inconvenience and ex-
pense to the defendant, the very evils that the due process limitation should
prevent.8 ' To the extent that state statutes fail to formulate clear, non-
fictive, and specific issues of jurisdictional fact, they fail to provide a
defendant with a basis for utilizing his right of collateral attack and exacer-
bate the problem of making defendant litigate in a distant forum of plain-
tiff's choosing.
78 Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y2d 281, 287-88, 200 N.E2d 427, 430,
251 N.Y.S.2d 433, 438 (1964). See "Developments in the Law," supra note 43, at
1016-17.
79 National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 325-33 (1964) (Black,
J., dissenting); 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1431 (1962). See Dodd, supra note 77, at 439;
"Developments in the Law," supra note 43, at 924, 991.
80 See Adams v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, (1938).
8175 Harv. L. Rev. 1431, 1432 (1962). A defendant may usually remove an
action within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts to the federal court of the
district in which the action was pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1958). Since diversity
of citizenship will usually exist in these cases, most will be removable. But this does
not substantially alleviate the problem presented, which is: should defendant be called
upon to defend at all in a distant tribunal, and not in which distant tribunal should he
defend. True, once defendant has removed the case, it may be transferred to "any
other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(1958). See Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Igoe, 212 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1954). But this
requires a showing of "convenience of parties and witnesses in the interest of
justice," 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958), which may be in essence as burdensome as
showing lack of minimum contact.
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The method of raising objections to personal jurisdiction may be
unduly prejudicial to defendants, depending on state procedural law.8 2
Many states still require a special appearance for the purpose of raising
objections to the court's jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. 83
A special appearance is usually easily waived, and the defendant may sub-
mit inadvertantly to the jurisdiction of a court and be forced to defend
where perhaps it was not necessary. In addition to the hazards of the
special appearance, many states allow no appeal of rulings on motions until
final judgment.8 4 When the court rules against defendant in these states,
he must either stand trial or hazard a guess that the court's ruling was
improper by defaulting, suffering final judgment to be rendered against
him, and appealing. Again, the more undefined and fictional the statutory
basis for jurisdiction, the more hazardous is this choice.
A principle allowing a state to assume personal jurisdiction in the
situation where consequences are effected within the forum state from
without its boundaries tends to discriminate between financially strong and
weak defendants, particularly in the products liability area. The national
manufacturer, with a multi-state organization and ample financial resources,
finds it easier to defend all over the country than does the small local manu-
facturer or distributor, who may not have the resources to defend in a
distant tribunal.85 Two possibilities for extortion arise from this situation:
primarily, the possibility of frivolous suits would seem to increase directly
proportionally to the probability of a default judgment against such a de-
fendant, and secondly, the "very threat of such a suit can be used to force
payment of alleged claims, even though they be wholly without merit."8 6
82 See "Developments in the Law," supra note 43, at 934; "Student Symposium-
A Reconsideration of 'Long-Arm' Jurisdiction," 37 Ind. L.J. 333, 341 (1962). See
generally, "Developments in the Law," supra at 991-997.
3 E.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2703.09 (Page 1953); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110 §
20 (Smith-Hurd 1956).84 E.g., Ohio Const., art. IV, § 6 ("judgments or final orders"); 2 Ohio Jur2d
Appellate Review § 28 (1953). This does not appear to be the rule in New York or
Illinois. Cf. N.Y. CPLR §§ 5701, 3211, 320 (McKinney's Supp. 1964), construed in
Renewal Prods., Inc. v. Kleen-Stick Prods., Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 645, 251 N.Y.S.2d
778 (Sup. Ct. 1964) ; Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.
2d 432, 176 N.E2d 761 (1961) (direct appeal to supreme court on constitutional
questions).
85 "Developments in the Law," supra note 43, at 929-30; "Student Symposium,"
supra note 82, at 343.
8 6 National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent, supra note 79, at 329. These possi-
bilities are not necessarily alleviated by including in the calculation or balance of
interests a factor of the defendant's strength or weakness as has been suggested.
"Student Symposium," supra note 82, at 348-52. The complexity of the issues involved
in determining the "best jurisdiction" for all concerned on every special appearance
creates considerable prejudice to defendants in and of itself, because of the substan-
tial expense to defendant in locating and paying an attorney to litigate such issues.
Nor is a liberal use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens a good solution for the
same reasons.
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Whether the defendant is an individual or a corporation may be relevant
in this connection, as individual businesses tend to be smaller and, in con-
trast to corporations, enjoy no limited liability.87 The limitation of many
state statutes to foreign corporations may still serve a valid interest here,
although probably originally based on the privileges and immunities clause
differentiation. s8 By making more burdensome the contest of the personal
jurisdiction question alone, indefinite state statutes contribute to the
problems of the weak defendant.
In sustaining jurisdiction in the instant case the court reflected the
modern trend toward expanded personal jurisdiction, a trend ultimately
based on the change since Pennoyer from localized economies to the present
interlocking national market, with easy interstate transportation and com-
munication.89 With products from every section finding their way into
every other section and multi-state business transactions becoming more
and more prevalent, litigation involving non-residents has become increas-
ingly common. The compelling argument is made that the state is interested
in providing its citizens redress in its own courts for causes of action
growing out of these transactions. 0 Yet if it has become easier to defend
in a distant forum because of increasing ease of transportation and com-
munication, it has also become easier to bring suit in such a forum. If a
state's procedural laws should provide for trial in the state so that plain-
tiff's remedy will not be limited by his having to bring suit in a distant
87 See "Developments in the Law," supra note 43, at 936. An individual may
have an additional constitutional ground of defense. See generally, Campbell, "Juris-
diction Over Nonresident Individuals and Foreign Corporations: The Privileges and
Immunities Clause," 36 Tulane L. Rev. 663 (1962). Campbell's thesis is that the
Court still has not faced the problem of the privileges and immunities clause as
applied to individual nonresident defendants, to wit: a state cannot exclude a citizen
under the privileges and immunities clause, and since it cannot exclude him it cannot
impose conditions on his entrance, with the exception of regulations under the police
power. Thus, the Court would seem to have to hold a great many activities within
the police power to sustain such statutes as § 302. The Court has not been faced
with the problem since only corporations have been involved in the recent cases.
However, Campbell is of the opinion that the Supreme Court will not invalidate
such legislation and will find a basis for treating foreign corporations and nonresident
individuals alike for jurisdictional purposes. Campbell's thesis finds support in Re-
statement, Judgments § 22, comment a (1942); Restatement (Second), Conflict of
Laws § 77-86 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956) ; Towe, supra note 38, at 7-9.
88 The following state statutes are limited to foreign corporations: Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 33-411 (1960), as amended, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-411 (Supp. 1964)
Md. Ann. Code art. 23 § 92 (1957) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 303.13 (Supp. 1964) ; Mo.
Ann. Stat § 351.630 (Supp. 1963); N.C. Gen. Stat. 55-144 (1960); Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 12, § 855 (1958). W. Va. Code Ann. § 3083 (1961) focuses on foreign corporations,
but its provisions also touch domestic corporations.
89 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958); McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).90 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961) ; Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d. 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
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state, they should also be arranged so that defendant is not hampered in
presenting his defenses, or forced to defend groundless suits in a distant
forum or else suffer a default judgment, especially since it is the defendant
that has the protection of the Constitution.91
In deciding whether to provide for personal jurisdiction in the situation
where consequences have allegedly been caused in the state from outside, a
legislature should balance the preceding interests carefully, together with
the state's own interests in effectuating its policies and laws and the possible
general hazards of too many forums. 92 The extent to which the court system
is generally burdened by a two-step litigation process, where a judgment
obtained in one jurisdiction must be executed by a special proceeding in
another, should also be considered. 93 The statutes should set up operative
jurisdictional facts specifically and with particularity, to avoid insofar as
possible the burdens on defendant arising from indefinite statutes. 94 In
this connection there may be inherent difficulty with "causing consequences"
statutes, since jurisdiction is often said to depend on the state's interest
in consequences effected within its borders; yet these consequences are not
held to be proper jurisdictional facts. If it is decided on balance that such
jurisdiction is desirable, the legislature should scrutinize carefully the
state's procedural law, eliminating such sources of prejudice to the defend-
ant as the special appearance and the final judgment rule. Safeguards,
such as requiring payment of defendant's litigation expenses by plaintiff,
should be incorporated to lessen the opportunity for frivolous suits against
defendants.9 5
The courts should not allow the "expansion of commerce" and "con-
venient jurisdiction" arguments to overcome the policy of logical statu-
tory construction, thus hindering the development of the definite rules
91 See "Developments in the Law," supra note 43, at 924.
92 The passage by many states of long-arm statutes tends to increase possibilities
of forum shopping and harrassment of defendants. In New York, jurisdiction has
been sustained where acts and consequences are in different states on the basis of
either. Singer v. Walker, 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S,2d 216 (1964) (acts the basis
of jurisdiction in New York); Feathers v. McLucas, 21 App. Div. 2d 558, 251
N.Y.S.2d 548 (1964) (consequences only occurred in New York). Including the
home state, where defendants can usually be served, there are thus at least three forums
available to plaintiffs with simple tort claims. But see Ellis v. Newton Paper Co.,
44 Misc. 2d 134, 253 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1964). If plaintiff institutes simultaneous suits,
defendant must at least plead a prior pending suit in the second court to avoid a
default judgment, and there is the hazard that two or more courts both may decide
they have jurisdiction, and defendant will have to defend two lawsuits in different
states. Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (litigation conducted in two
states). Furthermore, plaintiffs may often institute simultaneous suits, not knowing
under the indefinite minimum contacts test which states may have jurisdiction and
fearing that the statute of limitations may run in the proper state while a ruling on
jurisdiction is pending in the first state.
93 "Student Symposium," suPra note 82.
94 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 262.05 (Supp. 1964).
95 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 262.19-.20 (Supp. 1964).
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for in personam jurisdiction so necessary for the protection of de-
fendants. When a statute must, to provide jurisdiction in a particular
situation, be so interpreted that it no longer provides notice to defendants
generally, a court should rule that it may not constitutionally be applied in
that situation. An opposite interpretation makes a statute so indefinite that
defendants may not rely upon it and gives rise to further litigation about
its meaning. Yet in the instant case, where the policies of prevention of
frivolous suits and notice to defendant are not so applicable, it is difficult
to say that jurisdiction was unconstitutionally assumed under the statute
used. But whether or not this court's decision goes beyond the Supreme
Court's declared concept of permissible personal jurisdiction under the due
process clause, the decision points to a need for a clarification of that con-
cept for the guidance of both courts and legislatures, as well as for de-
fendants.
